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1. Introduction
A key feature of global trade in the new century is the rapid growth of off-
shoring. Yeats (2001) documents that in 1995 approximately thirty percent of
world manufacturing products trade is comprised by intermediate input trade. Ra-
manarayanan (2006) finds very similar patterns for OECD countries. The benefits
of offshoring is to enhance firm-level production efficiency. Bergin et al. (2011), for
example, indicates that a considerable number of American manufacturing firms
contract to carry out particular stages of productions abroad. This work sharing
design decreases production costs. Antras et al. (2014) further document the fact
that firms engaging in offshoring are larger and more productive than firms that
never import. Therefore, it is of importance to academics and policy makers to
analyze firms’ offshoring behaviors.
A growing literature investigates the benefits of offshoring and its impact on
the labor market (Bergin et al., 2011; Hummels, et al., 2011), how information
frictions and trade agreement affect firm-level offshoring behavior (Allen, 2015;
Dasgupta et al., 2014; Bernard et al., 2014; Antras and Staiger, 2012), and what
intermediates are more likely to be offshored (Furusawa et al., 2015). Little re-
search has been done to assess the link between the shocks to the final product
demand and offshoring behavior in intermediates. Demand shocks are often as-
sociated with trade liberalization: a reduction in trade costs in final products is
often accompanied by an increase in demand for these products. Chinese textile
and clothing exporters, for instance, import almost twice as many varieties and 20
percent more volume of intermediates after the Phase IV’s quotas removal1. The
1In 1994, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) gradually removed the quota imposed
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lack of research investigating the impact of a demand shock to final products on
firm-level offshoring behavior leaves the mechanism behind the above mentioned
empirical evidence uncovered, and the benefits of trade liberalization underesti-
mated.
This paper theoretically and empirically studies how export firms’ offshoring
behavior is associated with demand shocks in the final products. We are partic-
ularly interested in how a demand shock affects the number of intermediates a
firm imports. Bernard et al. (2009) find that the extensive margins of imports ac-
counts for approximately 65 percent of the cross-country variation in U.S. imports.
Bergin et al. (2011) document that both the extensive and intensive margins of
offshoring affects the volatility of economic activities, such as the fluctuations in
employment in Mexico, which is influenced by its offshoring industries. As a result,
analyzing firm-level offshoring of the extensive and intensive margin is of economic
importance.
This work extends the model of Antras et al. (2014) who build on Eaton and
Kortum (2002), to endogenize the firm-level offshoring decision. In this model, all
firms produce final goods by assembling a series of intermediates either purchased
domestically or offshored from foreign countries. To offshore from foreign coun-
tries, firms have to pay a fixed search cost to learn the prices of intermediates in
these countries. After searching, each firm offshores the intermediates from the
cheapest country they have searched.2 Differing form Antras et al. (2014), we
on textile and clothing products. The quotas were eliminated over four phases in January 1, 1995,
1998, 2002 and 2005, respectively. The quotas removal in January 1, 2005 is referred to as the
Phase IV quotas removal.
2For simplicity, I assume that the prices of intermediates in domestic market are observable
without searching. This means that firms can always purchase intermediates from domestic
market.
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allow final products to be exported to foreign countries. As a result, any demand
shock in foreign markets will change firm-level offshoring behavior. Intuitively,
if the demand faced by a firm increases, this firm would choose to search more
countries and offshore, on average, more varieties and a greater volume of inter-
mediates.3 This is because that searching more countries decreases the unit cost
of final products and the benefits of cost reduction is larger after the increase of
demand in final products.
We then empirically examine the theoretical predictions using a comprehensive
data set witch contains all Chinese firms producing textile and clothing products
during 2000-2006. On January 1, 2005 Phase IV of the Agreement on Textile and
Clothing (ATC) removed all the remaining quotas on products belonging to textile
and clothing categories. This event offers a natural experiment to test firm-level
offshoring responses to a demand shock. A rich set of literature has investigated
the impact of the quota removal on Chinese textile exporters’ performance. Khan-
delwal et al. (2013) document the rapid export growth of Chinese textile firms to
the U.S. after 2005 quota removal. Ahn et al. (2011) further show that the quota
removal lead to larger-than-expected gains for Chinese textile exporters. Rotunno
et al. (2013) find that while the quota removal on textile products increased Chi-
nese textile exports to US, its exports to Africa dropped significantly. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper, which attempts to document the impact
of the quota removal on firm-level offshoring behavior.
3The increase demand requires a greater volume of intermediate inputs, which increases the
firm’s incentive to search for lower price of each intermediate. On the one hand, this leads to
an increase in the offshoring probability for each intermediate, and more intermediates will be
offshored. On the other hand, larger demand and lower intermediate prices drive up the imported
volume of intermediates.
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We employ a difference-in-difference approach to test the the impact of the
quota removal on the firm-level extensive and intensive offshoring margins. Notice
that the number of intermediates being offshored is discrete and following Puhani
(2012), a nonlinear difference-in-difference estimation has been conducted as a
robustness check. Using the firm-level export and import data from textile and
clothing industry in China, we find that the firm-level offshoring varieties and
volumes of intermediates increase significantly after the quota removal.
This work contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of global
production sharing. It disentangles the link between demand shocks in final prod-
ucts and firm-level offshoring behavior. This paper is closely related to Furusawa
et al. (2015) who document the determinants of firm-level offshoring decisions,
but neglect the influence of foreign demand on firm-level offshoring behavior. This
paper finds results similar to Antras and Staiger (2012), who show the impact of
trade agreements on the intensive margin of offshoring. Nonetheless, Our model
predicts that after accounting for firm search behavior, the impact of trade agree-
ments on on the firm-level intensive margin of offshoring is larger. This is because
firm search lowers its own marginal cost, which further increase offshoring volumes.
This work is also in line with Bergin et al. (2011) who document that the firm-level
offshoring is determined by the relative intermediate production costs in foreign
and domestic countries. An exogenous shock to foreign intermediates cost shrinks
the domestic firms’ offshoring varieties of intermediates. A similar mechanism
works in this framework, but in a multi-country setting the relative intermediates
cost in foreign and domestic markets is affected by firm-level endogenous searching.
Demand shocks change firm-level offshoring behavior through changes in the firm-
level search behavior. In contrast to Bernard et al. (2014), who claim that lowering
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search cost leads to more offshoring and hence an increase in the demand for final
products, this paper emphasizes reverse channel; an increase in demand motivates
the firm-level extensive and intensive margins for offshoring intermediates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 3 introduces the background of the multifiber agreement (MFA)
and Chinese textile and clothing exports. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
discusses the regression design and reports the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model
In this section, I extend Antras et al. (2014) model to investigate the impact
of demand shocks on extensive and intensive margins of offshoring at firm-level.
2.1. Demand
Suppose there are J countries in the world. The representative consumer’s
preferences for final goods takes the CES form:
U =
(∫
ω∈Ωj
q(ω)(σ−1)/σ
)σ/(σ−1)
, (1)
where Ωj is the set of all final goods available to consumers in country j, and σ
denotes the elasticity of substitution across final products. The preference leads
to the following demand for final good ω in country j at period t:
qjt(ω) = Ajtpjt(ω)
−σ, (2)
where pjt(ω) is the price of final good ω, and Ajt is the residual demand of ω in
country j at period t. To simplify notation in following sections, we define Bjt and
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Bt as follows:
Bjt =
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)(1−σ)
Ajtτ
1−σ
ij . (3)
Bt =
∑
j∈Jexi (ϕ,Bwt )
Bjt, (4)
where Bjt is the transportation cost adjusted residual demand in country j at
period t. Note that Bjt is proportional to the residual demand in country j at
period t, Ajt. B
w
t = (B1t, B2t, ..., BJt), is a vector that contains every country’s
transportation cost adjusted residual demand in period t, and Bt is the aggregate
adjusted residual demand of all countries to which a firm exports.4 We allow
Bωt to vary over time, in order to capture exogenous demand shocks. τij is the
ice-berg transportation cost between country i and j, where τij = 1 if i = j.
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Jexi (ϕ,B
w
t ) ⊆ J is the set of countries a firm located in base country i at period t
exports to, given its productivity level, ϕ, and the vector of world adjusted residual
demand, Bwt .
2.2. Supply
In order to produce the final goods, each firm needs to assemble a series of
intermediates. Following Antras et al. (2014), intermediates can be offshored and
the model’s equilibrium will imply the location of the production of different in-
termediates. Intermediates are assumed to be imperfectly substitutable with each
other at a constant elasticity substitution ρ, and distributed continuously over the
range [0,1].
4Note that the set of countries to which the firm exports depends on Bw, not on B.
5In order to stress the impact of demand shocks on firm-level offshoring decisions, we assume
the transportation cost is fixed over time so as to isolate other possible mechanism which affect
firm-level offshoring behavior.
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All intermediates are produced under the constant return to scale technology.
Denote aj(v) the labor requirement associated with the production of intermediate
input v ∈ [0, 1] in country j ∈ J .6 free-on-board price for intermediate v from
country j in period t is given by aj(v)ωjt, where ωjt is the wage rate in country j
at period t. As such, the cost of importing one unit of intermediate v from country
j to country i in period t can be written as:
cijt(v) = τijajωjt (5)
The parameter aj represents country j’s efficiency in producing intermediates.
For a given wage rate ωjt, a lower labor requirement, lower aj, implies that country
j has greater competitiveness in the production of intermediates. Following Eaton
and Kortum (2002), we assume the country specific efficiency aj follows a Frechet
distribution:
Pr(aj(v) ≥ a) = e−Tjaθ , with Tj > 0, (6)
where Tj governs the state of the technology in country j. A larger Tj implies
a higher country specific efficiency. θ reflects the amount of variation within the
distribution where larger θ implies less variability. Two features of equation (6)
are worth addressing: first, a country’s efficiency in an intermediate is independent
of its type; second, a country with a higher Tj will be, on average, more efficient
in all intermediates.
With all the above assumptions, the unit assembly cost of final goods for a firm
6Similar to the transportation cost, aj(v) is assumed to be time invariant. This assumption
is to exclude the impact of country-level productivity changes on firms’ offshoring behavior.
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located in country i, with productivity ϕ in period t is:7
cft(ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(∫ 1
0
(
τij(v)(v)aj(v)ωj(v)t
)1−ρ
dv
) 1
1−ρ
, (7)
where j(v) denotes the country from which intermediate v is imported. Note
that the final goods production cost relies on the firm’s productivity, ϕ. This is to
capture the fact that more productive firms can assemble the series of intermediates
more efficiently. Different from Antras et al. (2014), we assume the final goods can
be sold in both domestic and international markets.
Firms cannot observe aj for any country, unless it pays a fixed search cost,
f sijωit. Denote J
s
i (ϕ,Bt) ⊆ J the set of countries a firm based in i with productivity
ϕ has searched. Jsi (ϕ,Bt) is called the searching strategy of this firm. Different
than Antras et al. (2014), the searching strategy not only depends on the firm-
level productivity, but also the aggregate residual demand of the countries the firm
exports to. The intuition is that as aggregate transportation cost adjusted residual
demand, Bt increases so do the benefits of searching for cheaper intermediates.
2.3. Firms’ Behavior Conditional on a Sourcing Strategy
Given a searching strategy, a firm based in country i chooses to purchase each
required intermediate input from the cheapest country it has searched. The off-
shoring probability of any intermediate is given by:
χ(ϕ,Bt) = 1− Tiω
−θ
it
Θi(ϕ,Bt)
, (8)
7As in Melitz (2003), the firm-level productivity, ϕ, is fixed after the initial productivity draw.
However, the marginal costs may vary over time due to changes in the offshoring behavior.
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where
Θi(ϕ,Bt) =
∑
k∈Jsi (ϕ,Bt)
Tk(τikωkt)
−θ. (9)
Equation (8) and (9) imply that the offshoring probability of any intermediate
is increasing in Θi(ϕ,Bt), the offshoring capability.
After choosing the cheapest country to import the corresponding intermediates
from, the marginal cost of the final goods for the firm with productivity ϕ is:
cft(ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(γΘi(ϕ,Bt))
−1/θ, (10)
where, γ =
[
Γ
(
θ+1−ρ
θ
)]θ/(1−ρ)
. Equation (10) conveys the information that giv-
en the firm’s searching strategy, more productive firms will have lower marginal
costs for assembling final goods. More importantly, a firm which has searched
more countries, will have lower marginal costs. The intuition is that, when a firm
searches more countries, the expected price for each intermediate falls.
Firms in base country i can export to any country j after paying a fixed cost
f exij ωit. The superscript ex indicates export, which is to distinguish from the fixed
search cost, f sijωit. From the demand function, we can derive the firm-level profits
as:
pii(ϕ,Bt) = ϕ
σ−1(γΘi(ϕ,Bt))(σ−1)/θBt − ωit
∑
j∈Jsi (ϕ,Bt)
f sij − ωit
∑
j∈Jexi (ϕ,Bwt )
f exij . (11)
2.4. Firms’ Optimization
Each firm needs to make a series of decisions to maximize its per-period profit.
The sequence of the game is as follows. Each firm draws a productivity, ϕ, from
a given distribution after paying an entry cost. A demand shock in country j,
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∆Bjt, occurs at the beginning of period t, and is observed by all firms. Each firm
decides which country it will export to, from which to offshore and set the optimal
price in each market. All decisions are made at the beginning of each period. The
subsequent sections will show the responses of firm-level offshoring behavior to a
demand shock.
2.4.1. Incomplete Information
To guarantee the model is solvable, we assume that this game is a simultaneous
game and each firm has incomplete information about the decisions of other firms
when it makes its own decisions in each period. In particular, firms with incomplete
information at the beginning of period t forecast all state variables, except the
demand shock, take the same values as in period t − 1. For instance, at the
beginning of period t, a firm expects the residual demand in country j to be
Bj,t−1 + ∆Bjt, where ∆Bjt is the observed demand shock in country j at the
period t. In another words, a firm with incomplete information does not account
for other firms’ strategic responses to a demand shock. Instead, it only observe
other firms’ responses in the subsequent period.8
The incomplete information assumption allows to neglect the equilibrium in-
put of demand shocks on local wages. Intuitively, a positive demand shock in
country j, ∆Bjt, will encourage more domestic firms to start offshoring or search
more countries for cheaper intermediates. This change in offshoring behavior re-
duces firm-level marginal costs and hence changes the labor demand in the home
country. If all firms have complete information, they all expect the wage effect
8Firm level productivity could be private information. As such, each firm cannot observe
other firms’ productivity, and may not be able to forecast other firms’ responses to a demand
shock.
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caused by demand shocks. As such, each firm further adjusts its exporting and
offshoring strategies. This interdependence between wages and offshoring strate-
gies in the case of complete information makes it difficult to characterize optimal
firm behavior.
Note that in equilibrium, the case of incomplete information is equivalent to
the case of complete information. The reason is that when no demand shock takes
place, the state variables, such as the residual demand, wage, etc, are constant in
each country. As a result, Bjt = Bj,t−1 = Bj, and ωjt = ωj,t−1 = ωj. Therefore,
each firm’s forecast of the state variables in period t is correct.9
2.4.2. Optimal Offshoring Decisions
A firm’s optimal offshoring strategy balances the gain from marginal cost re-
ductions against the search costs which arise from searching an additional country.
The optimal offshoring strategy depends both on firm-level productivity, ϕ, and
expected aggregate residual demand, EBt. The two variables determine the firm-
level returns from searching one more country. The optimal offshoring strategy at
period t maximizes expected profit:
maxIijt∈{0,1}Jj=1Etpii (ϕ,Bt, Ii1t..., Ii2t) = ϕ
σ−1(γ
J∑
j=1
IijtTj(τijωj,t−1)−θ)(σ−1)/θEBt
− ωi,t−1
 J∑
j=1
Iijtf
s
ij +
∑
j∈Jexi (ϕ,EBwt )
f exij
 ,
(12)
9Note that the empirical estimation results still hold even without the incomplete information
assumption. The reason is that all firms experience a change in domestic wages. Fortunately,
the difference-in-difference approach will control for any change effect.
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where, with incomplete information EBt = Bt−1 + ∆Bt and EBωt = B
w
t−1 + ∆B
w
t .
This implies that when a firm maximizes its profit at the beginning of period t,
it is based on the realized world residual demand vector in period t, Bωt−1 and the
demand shock, ∆Bωt . The economy is assumed to be in an equilibrium before the
demand shock, as such, Bω1 = B
ω
2 = ... = B
ω
t−1. Firm-level optimal strategies are
identical from period 1 to period t− 1.
Similar to the proof in Antras et al. (2014), it can be shown that given the
firm-level productivity, ϕ, the searching strategy under a low expected aggregate
adjusted residual demand is a subset of the searching strategy under a high ex-
pected aggregate adjusted residual demand. This point is formally presented in
the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Whenever (σ − 1)/θ > 1 and the economy is in an equilibrium
before period t, which implies EBt−1 = Bt−1 = ... = B1. Jsi (ϕ,EBt) ⊇ Jsi (ϕ,Bt−1)
for EBt > Bt−1, where Jsi (ϕ,EBt) = {j : Iijt(ϕ,EBt) = 1}.
Proposition 1 implies that if a demand shock at period t increases the expected
aggregate demand facing a firm, the set of countries a firm searches will be larger
or equal to that at period t − 1. This is because the benefits from a reduction
in marginal costs by searching an additional country is larger after the shock.
The proof is in the Appendix. In particular, the export decisions and searching
strategies are interdependent. A positive shock to the expected aggregate resid-
ual demand, EBt, increases the firm-level searching strategy, J
s
i (ϕ,EBt). This
increase further lowers firm-level assembly costs. The firm may choose to enter
more foreign markets because of its increased competitiveness, which could further
increase the aggregate residual demand faced by the firm. The set of countries to
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which the firm searches for intermediates could increase again. This process lasts
until the firm does not export to any new foreign market and no longer searches
new countries for intermediates.
Notice that the demand shock is at country level, ∆Bkt. It can be proved that
the expected aggregate residual demand faced by any firm EBt is not decreasing
in EBkt, for ∀k:
∂EBt
∂EBkt
=

sign(∆Jex)
∑
∆Jex
EBjt if k /∈ Jex(ϕ,Bωt−1)
1 + sign(∆Jex)
∑
∆Jex
EBjt if k ∈ Jex(ϕ,EBωt−1)
≥ 0, (13)
where ∆Jex = Jex(ϕ,EBωt ) − Jex(ϕ,Bωt−1) is the set of countries to which a firm
exports after the positive demand shock, ∆Bkt. EB
ω
t = {B1,t−1, B2,t−1, ..., Bk,t−1 +
∆Bkt, ...BJ,t−1}, is the expected world residual demand at period t and Bωt−1 =
{B1,t−1, B2,t−1, ..., Bk,t−1, ..., BJ,t−1} is its counterpart vector before the demand
shock. Before the demand shock, the economy was in equilibrium, we have EBjt =
EBj,t−1 = Bj,t−1 = ... = Bj,1. This implies EBωt = B
ω
t−1 + ∆Bk,t. The term∑
∆Jex
EBjt captures the expected aggregate residual demand change caused by ex-
porting to a larger or smaller number of countries after the demand shock. If the
firm exports to more countries, sign(∆Jex) is positive and otherwise is negative
or zero. The proof of inequality (13) is in the Appendix. Intuitively, the country-
level demand shock affects the aggregate residual demand, EBt, faced by a firm in
two interdependent channels: on one hand, some of the countries experiencing a
demand shock belong to the firm’s export set. As such, the country-level demand
shock has a positive influence on the expected aggregate residual demand faced
by this firm. On the other hand, the firm may choose to export to an additional
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country, whose residual demand has increased. A firm may chooses to search more
countries for cheaper intermediates which enable it to enter a previously nonprof-
itable market. Either one increases the aggregate residual demand faced by this
firm. Therefore, the expected aggregate residual demand, EBt, faced by a firm is
non-decreasing in EBkt, k ∈ J .
Note that, if a firm does not export to countries experiencing demand shocks
neither before nor after the shocks, the firm’s exporting and offshoring strategies
would be unaffected by the demand shocks. The reason is that these firms, with
incomplete information, face the same state variables in period t and t − 1. As
such, these firms’ exporting and offshoring strategies would be the same in both
periods. This implies that only firms whose export set contains countries experi-
encing demand shocks will change their offshoring behavior in response to demand
shock.10
When a firm’s searching strategy is non-decreasing in the expected aggregate
residual demand of the countries to which it exports, equation (9) implies that the
firm’s offshoring capability, Θi(ϕ,EBt), is non-decreasing in EBt.
11 From equation
(8) the offshoring probability of any intermediate input is also non-decreasing in
EBt. This further implies that the firm will import more varieties of intermediates
in period t relative to period t − 1 as long as the demand shock increases the
expected aggregate residual demand the firm faces. Formally, we have the following
proposition:
10The countries experiencing demand shock either belong to these firms’ export set as of t− 1
or are added to the export set at period t.
11Equation (9) indicates that the sourcing capability, Θi(ϕ,EBt), increases in J
s
i (ϕ,EBt), and
Jsi (ϕ,EBt) is non-decreasing in EBt. Therefore, Θi(ϕ,EBt) is non-decreasing in EBt.
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Proposition 2. When (σ − 1)/θ > 1, the firm-level offshoring probability for any
intermediate is increasing in the expected aggregate residual demand, EBt. As
such, a positive demand shock, which influences the expected aggregate residual
demand a firm faces, increases the firm-level imported varieties of intermediates.
Proposition 2 indicates that only firms, whose expected aggregate residual de-
mands are increasing in demand shocks, increase their offshored varieties of in-
termediates.12 Instead, the firms, whose expected aggregate residual demands are
unaffected by the demand shock, would keep their offshoring strategies.
Since the total cost of intermediates is proportional to total revenue, Ctoti (ϕ,EBt) =
σ−1
σ
Ri(ϕ,EBt), along with Proposition 1 and 2, the firm-level intensive margin of
imports is increasing in the expected aggregate residual demand faced by the firm.
Greater expected aggregate residual demand implies higher firm-level revenues and
greater offshoring probabilities. Both of them determine the higher-level of import
intermediates. As such, demand shocks which increase the expected aggregate
residual demand faced by a firm, increases the firm’s intensive margin of imports.
This point is formally summarized in the following proposition, and the proof is
in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. Whenever (σ−1)/θ > 1, the firm-level intensive margin of imports
is increasing in the expected aggregate residual demand faced by the firm. As such,
a positive demand shock increases the firm-level intensive margin of exports, for
those whose expected aggregate residual demands are affected.
Quota removal could be treated as a positive shock on the residual demand in
12Two types of firms are affected by the demand shock: the countries which experience the
demand shock must belong to the firms’ export set either in period t− 1 or period t.
16
some foreign countries. For exporters, whose expected aggregate residual demand,
EBt, is affected by the demand shock, Proposition 2 and 3 provide two testable
predictions that these firms, on average, import more intermediates, in terms of
extensive margin (more varieties) and intensive margin (larger volumes).13 The
next section models the connection between the removal of quotas and the expected
aggregate demand increase.
2.5. The Impact of Quota Removal on Firms’ Behaviors
Under an export quota restriction, the government typically allocates export
quotas by auction (Khandelwal et al., 2013). Therefore, each exporter needs to
pay a unit license fee for their exports. The export price in market j at period s
is given by equation (14)
pjs(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1(τijcfs(ϕ) + lj), (14)
where lj is the unit license fee for firms exporting quota restricted products to
country j at period s. lj > 0 for s = 1, 2, ..., t − 1 and lj = 0 for s ≥ t.14 Let
τ̂ij = τij +
lj
cfs(ϕ)
denote the ice-berg cost for shipping 1 unit of a quota restricted
product from country i to country j at period t. We have τ̂ij > τij for any
product exported under a quota. Using the definition of Bjt in equation (3), it
is straightforward to show that the removal in period t leads to the following
13Proposition 1 is not testable, because the set of countries from which the firm imports is not
identical to the set of countries it searches. For instance, suppose a firm originally searches and
imports from 3 countries, denoted by {1,2,3}. After the removal of quotas, it searches country
4. The prices of all intermediates are lower in the 4th country, and so the firm imports all
intermediates from the 4th country. In this case, after the removal of quotas the set of countries
from which it imports is {4}, but the set of countries from which it searches is {1,2,3,4}.
14 As the economy has been assumed to be in an equilibrium before period t, the unit license
fee is assumed to be constant from period 1 to t− 1.
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inequality:
EBjt =
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)(1−σ)
Ajτ
1−σ
ij >
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)(1−σ)
Aj τ̂
1−σ
ij = Bj,t−1, (15)
where Bj,t−1 is the residual demand in country j at period t − 1. Inequality (15)
indicates that a quota removal in country j at period t is equivalent to an increase
in the residual demand in country j. This property offers a natural experiment to
test Proposition 2 and 3: the quota removal leads firms, which previously exported
under quota restriction, to import more intermediates both in terms of varieties
and volumes.15
The next section introduces the Multifibre Agreement and its later cancellation.
3. Background of MFA and ATC
China’s textile and clothing industry accounts for a nonnegligible share of Chi-
na’s overall exports and the world exports of textile and clothing. In 2004, China’s
textile and clothing exports account for 15% of its total exports and 23% of the
world textile and clothing exports.
The Multifibre Agreement (MFA) had been used to restrain the import of tex-
tiles, especially from developing countries. It was initially used by the United
States to limit textile imports from Japan in 1955. A consequence of the M-
FA is that the textile and clothing products were held out of the multinational
trade negotiation. In 1994, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations included
the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC), which was to end the MFA and
15Strictly speaking, the impact of a quota removal on residual demand varies across firms.
This is because firms with different productivities, ϕ, will have different unit costs cf (ϕ). As a
result, τ̂ij reduces more for firms with high productivities after the quota removal.
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gradually remove the quota imposed on textile and clothing products. The quotas
were eliminated over four phases by integrating textile and clothing products into
GATT/WTO rules. The U.S., E.U., and Canada were required to remove textile
and clothing quotas on January 1, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005, respectively. In the
first three phases the the countries have to integrate products representing 16, 17,
and 18 percent of their 1990 import volumes, and in Phase IV this figure increased
to 49 percent. A considerable share of quotas removed in Phase IV were binding.16
In particular, about 65 percent quotas are binding in the U.S., E.U. and Canada.
The detailed quota binding rates in each region are reported in Table 1.
[Table 1 is to be here]
Table 1 shows that about 1,500 types of textile and clothing products exported
to the U.S., E.U., or Canada were under quota restrictions, and more than 900
quotas were binding in 2004.
Removing the binding quotas lead to a surge of textile and clothing exports.
China, for instance, saw its textile and clothing exports to the U.S. almost double
after the Phase IV quota removal, while the exports to the rest of the world
increased by less than 3%. More details are reported in Table 2.
[Table 2 is to be here]
The distinct growth patterns between the rest of the world and the region-
s removing quotas indicate the significant role quotas played in restricting firm
exports. Under a quota restriction, firms have to pay a unit license fee for their
16Following Evans and Harrigan (2005); Brambilla et al. (2009), if a quota’s fill rate exceeds
90%, the quota is treated as binding.
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exports (e.g. Demidova et al., 2011). This license fee increases each firm’s export
price and, as such, its demand in the foreign market shrinks. The removal of quo-
tas reduces the license fee to zero and hence, all other things equal, increases the
foreign demand for each firm. As such, the Phase IV quota removal offers an ideal
setting to analyze Chinese export firms’ offshoring response to a demand shock.
4. Data
The empirical exercises require data from two sources. One is the Chinese
Custom data collected by the Chinese Custom Trade Statistics (CCTS), which
report the firm-level exports and imports at HS8 disaggregated level. In addition,
this dataset reports the firm-product specific export destinations. The other data
source is MFA/ATC quotas, which provides the product-level quota information
in the U.S., E.U. and Canada.17
The first step is to clean the CCTS data by deleting all firms which never
exported textile or clothing products in 2004 and 2005. Second, we carefully
match the two pieces of data using the HS code provided in both of them. The
matched sample offers the following information: 1. the number of each firm’s
imported intermediates; 2. the firm-level import values; 3. countries to which
each firm’s products are exported; 4. the country-product specific quota status;18
5. the number of products each firm exports. The matched sample exhibits a
clear increase pattern in the number of imported intermediates for firms exporting
textile and clothing to the U.S., E.U., or Canada. Detailed results are reported in
17The data have been sorted by Peter Schott, and is downloadable at his homepage:
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub international.htm
18The information reflects whether exported product is subject to a quota in a given country,
and what the quota fill rate is.
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Table 3.
[Table 3 is to be here]
Part A and Part B of Table 3 report the average number of imported varieties
and the total value of imported intermediates for firms exporting to different desti-
nations, respectively. Column 1 of Part A reports the average number of varieties
imported intermediates by firms exporting to the rest of the world (ROW) other
than U.S., E.U., and Canada. Columns 2-4 of Part A show the figures for firms
exporting to the U.S., E.U., or Canada, respectively, while columns 5-8 show the
same information for firms engaged ordinary trade.19 The results indicate that
among firms engaged in ordinary trade, the number of imported varieties more
than doubled between 2004 to 2005 on average. Part B suggests a similar pattern
for average firm-level import values between 2004 and 2005, except for firms ex-
porting to ROW in the full sample. Whereas, it is unclear whether the increase
trend is caused by Phase IV’s quota removal or simply represents a time trend.
Making use of the quota information, I can classify firms into treatment and
control groups based on the quota status of their exports. According to the model,
the treated group contains firms whose expected residual demands are affected by
the quota removal, while all other firms belong to the control group. In 2004,
there are 12,137 firms that export textile and clothing products, of which 3,843
firms export under binding quotas. The classification rules are discussed in detail
in the next section. By comparing the offshoring responses across treatment and
19A firm is treated as an exporter to a destination if the firm exports at least one product to
this destination. Therefore, if a firm exports to the U.S., E.U. and Canada, this firm will be used
repeatedly in Table 3.
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control groups, we can identify the impact of the quota removal on firms’ offshoring
behavior.
5. Estimation and Results
In this section, we use a difference-in-different strategy to analyze how firm
offshoring behavior changes after the quota removal on textile and clothing on
January of 2005. The identification relies on the comparison between firms in
the affected product category (the treatment group) and those in the unaffected
product category (the control group). Firms are classified into treatment and
control groups in several ways.
In the baseline regression, firms which never export quota restricted products
belong to the control group, while all other firms make up the treatment group.20
There are several issues that are worth addressing here. First, consider a product
that is subject to a quota restriction only in the U.S., but a firm which exports this
product to a country without any quota restrictions (South Africa, for instance).
In the baseline regression, this firm is considered to be treated. One reason for this
is that Chinese textile and clothing exporters often use third countries as quota-
hopping export platforms (Rotunno et al., 2013). Therefore, a quota removal in the
U.S. might still have an impact on the firm’s expected aggregate residual demand.
This sensitivity of our results to our classification of firms will be evaluated in our
robustness checks.
Second, it could be the case that some firms export quota restricted products
in 2004, but stopping export these products in 2005. In this case, these firms
20The full sample contains firms exporting textile or clothing products at least in one year.
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experience a negative demand shock. It seems problematic to treat these firms as
treated. To address this concern, we calculate the share of firms dropping quota
restricted products in a treated group and find that they represent less than 4%
of all firms. Dropping these firms and re-estimating the baseline model, we find
very similar results.
The baseline regression is as follows:
yit = β1Treatmenti + β2Postt + β3Treatmenti × Postt + β4xit + it, (16)
where yit represents the firm-level outcome variables including the number and
total values of imported intermediates for firm i in year t. Treatmenti is a dummy
variable which takes value 1 if firm i belongs to the treatment group, 0 otherwise.
Postt is the time dummy variable taking the value 1 after year 2004, 0 otherwise.
xit are control variables, including the number of products each firm exports,
ownership fixed effect and product fixed effects21. The reason we include the
number of products a firm export in the regression is to control for the impact of
the number of final products on firm-level offshoring behavior. For instance, firms
producing more final products usually require more varieties of intermediates.
Note that one of the dependent variables, the number of varieties of import-
ed intermediates, is discrete. This count data feature suggests that a Poisson
21The product fixed effect are to control for the influence of firm-level exports on firm-level
offshoring behavior. The product fixed effect is aggregated at HS2 level as a number of firms
export multiple products.
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regression to evaluate the treatment effect:
f(y|z) = Φ(βz), (17)
Φ(βz) = exp [−exp(βz)] [exp(βz)]y/y!,
βz = β1Treatmenti + β2Postt + β3Treatmenti × Postt + β4xit + it.
We make use of regression (17) to evaluate the treatment effect as a robustness
check of the baseline model. Puhani (2012) points out that the nonlinear treatment
effect is different from a linear treatment effect. In particular, in the nonlinear case,
the treatment effect is not the cross difference, but the difference between two cross
differences. Mathmatically, the treatment effect is:
treatment = Φ(β1 + β2 + β3 + β4xit)− Φ(β1 + β2 + β4xit). (18)
Equation (18) implies that although the treatment effect is not identical across
individuals, a positive β3 still indicates a positive treatment effect. The results
from the baseline regression for the extensive and intensive margin of offshoring
are reported in Table 4 and Table 5.
[Table 4 is to be here]
[Table 5 is to be here]
Table 4 reports the treatment effects of the quota removal on the extensive
margin of offshoring, which are estimated using OLS and Poisson regressions,
respectively. Columns 1-2 in Table 4 report the treatment effect results by dividing
all textile products exporters into treatment and control groups. In contrast,
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columns 3-4 report the treatment effect results by restricting the sample to firms
engaged in ordinary trade. The results indicate a positive impact of the quota
removal on offshoring decisions. Specifically, the treatment group imports, on
average, 0.7− 0.9 more varieties of intermediates than the control group, after the
quota removal. At the the same time, Table 5 reports the treatment effects of
the quota removal on the intensive offshoring margin. Similar to Table 4, column
1 shows the treatment effect for all firms, and column 2 reports the results by
restricting the sample to ordinary trade exporters. The results indicate that for
the quota removal increases the value of imported intermediates by 13−20 percent.
In January 2005, the U.S., E.U., and Canada were the only regions removing
quotas on textile and clothing products from developing countries. This implies
that the quota removal mainly influences firms which export textile products to
the set of countries lifting the quota restrictions. For example, shipments of “men’s
or boy’s jackets” (HS 610339) were subjected to an import quota in the U.S., E.U.,
and Canada in 2004 but not in the other countries. In this case, the impact of
quota removal on firm-level offshoring behavior is much more limited among firms
exporting to countries other than the U.S., E.U., and Canada.
It is also possible that a firm exports textile products to regions with quota
restrictions, but the fill rate, which is defined as the percentage a quota that is
used, does not bind. For instance, China’s exports of “Multiple or Cabled Yarn”
(HS 550912) to the U.S. is exported under an unbinding quota.22 In this case,
classifying firms which export products subject to an unbinding quota into the
treatment group may be inappropriate.
22Following the definition of Khandelwal et al. (2013), if the quota fill rate is less than 90%,
the quota is treated as not binding
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To check if the classification of firms into treatment and control groups in the
baseline regression biases the evaluation of the treatment effect, we redefine firms
as belonging to the treatment group if 1. firms export to the U.S., E.U., or Canada;
2. at least one of the products they export is subject to a binding quota. All other
firms belong to the control group.
Using the newly defined treatment and control groups we re-estimate equation
(16) and (17), respectively. The results are reported in Table 6 and Table 7:
[Table 6 is to be here]
[Table 7 is to be here]
The results in Table 6 indicate that the quota removal had a positive impact
on the number of offshored varieties regardless of our estimation methodology.
For firms engaged in ordinary trade, the quota removal increases, on average, the
number of imported intermediates by 0.5 units. For the full sample the effect
is even stronger; we find that the quota removal increases the average number
of imported intermediates by more than 2 units. This might suggests that firms
engaged in processing trade respond more to the quota removal than firms engaged
in ordinary trade. At the same time, the results in Table 7 show that the quota
removal tends to increase the values of offshored intermediates by 19 and 27 percent
for the full sample and firms engaged in ordinary trade, respectively.
Another concern is that multi-product firms often introduce new products or
drop old products. The products-switching within multi-product firms may have
a significant impact on the firm-level offshoring behavior. For instance, a firm
which begins offshoring more varieties of intermediates might also be introducing
products. Thus may confuse product-switching with the removal of quotas. In
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contrast, some multi-product firms might export only a small share of its products
to quota restricted regions. As a result, the impact of the quota removal on these
multi-product firms may be relatively small. For the above reason, classifying these
multi-product firms as treated firms may be controversial. To exclude the impact
of within-firm product and destination churning on their offshoring behaviors, we
restrict attention to firms whose main product accounts for at least 50% of their
total export revenue. These firms are treated as single product firms (e.g. Hu
et al., 2015) and it is straightforward to track their export decisions over time.
These ‘single product’ firms are classified into treatment and control groups based
on the destination that their main product is exported to and the quota fill rate
as in the second specification. The results are reported in Table 8 and Table 9:
[Table 8 is to be here]
[Table 9 is to be here]
All results in Table 8 and Table 9 exhibit a very similar pattern to those in
Table 6 and Table 7. Relative to the control group, the firms in the treatment
group tend to import more intermediates, both on the extensive and intensive
margins, after the quota removal.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a model that disentangles the link between a demand shock
in final product market and the firm-level offshoring behavior. The model predicts
that higher final product demand causes firms to search more countries for cheaper
intermediates. This is because the higher demand increases firm profitability,
which in turn covers higher fixed search costs. After firms search more source
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countries, more varieties and higher volumes of intermediates will be offshored
instead of being purchased from the domestic market.
Using the textile and clothing export and import data from China, we find
that the removal of quotas on textile and clothing products increases the number
of varieties and volume of intermediates offshored. This implies that a positive
demand shock on final products enhances exporters’ participation in offshoring.
The empirical results are robust to different regression designs.
Documented by a number of research papers, the global work sharing is an
effective way to enhance firm-level production efficiency. One implication of this
paper is that increased final product demand encourages global offshoring, and im-
proves firm-level production efficiency. Neglecting this effect suggests the benefits
of trade liberalization may be underaluated.
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Appendix (Tables)
Table 1: Quota Fill Rate
All Three Regions U.S. E.U. cCAN
Number of Quotas 1,415 467 507 441
Number of Binding Quotas 917 426 287 204
Fill Rate 64.81% 91.22% 56.61% 46.26%
Notes: A quota is defined as a binding quota when its fill rate exceeds 90%. The products are disaggregated at
HS8 digit level
Table 2: The Export Values and Growth Rate
Year ROW U.S. E.U. CAN
2004 589 70 76 10.7
2005 605 139 140 17.5
Growth Rate 2.83% 97.91% 72.83% 63.55%
Notes: Table 2 reports the export revenue growth of textiles and clothing to the U.S., E.U., Canada, and rest of
the world, respectively. Revenues are measured in 10 million US dollars.
Table 3: The Average Number of Imported Intermediates
A: Average Imported Varieties
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
Year ROW U.S. E.U. CAN ROW U.S. E.U. CAN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2004 1.90 2.81 2.51 2.31 2.47 1.86 2.07 1.38
2005 2.59 3.10 2.74 3.50 2.59 4.67 4.33 7.05
B: Average Imported Values
Year ROW U.S. E.U. CAN ROW U.S. E.U. CAN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2004 1.47 1.29 1.38 1.68 1.05 0.92 0.91 0.92
2005 1.49 1.32 1.45 1.60 1.10 0.97 1.04 0.97
Notes: Table 3 reports the average number of imported varieties and the total value of importing intermediates
for firms exporting to the U.S., E.U., CA, and the rest of the world. The varieties of intermediates are defined at
HS6 disaggregate level, and the value are measured in 10 thousand of USD.
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Table 4: The Impact of Quota Removal on Firms’ Extensive Importing Margin
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
1 2 3 4
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Treatment 0.7221∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.9682∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗
(0 .4416 ) (0 .0058 ) (0 .4641 ) (0 .0072 )
# of Product 0.2208∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.1422∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗
(0 .0030 ) (0 .0001 ) (0 .0041 ) (0 .0001 )
Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.22 0.32 0.15 0.30
Obs 90, 330 90, 330 76, 231 76, 231
Notes: Table 4 presents the treatment effect of the quota removal on the numbers of imported varieties at the
firm-level. The treatment group contains firms exporting textile products which were subject to quota restrictions
before 2005. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 5: The Impact of Quota Removal on Firms’ Intensive Importing Margin
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
1 2
Treatment 0.1313∗∗ 0.2024∗∗∗
(0.0529 ) (0.0679 )
# of Product 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗
(0.0003 ) (0.0004 )
Ownership FE Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes
R-square 0.08 0.08
Obs 66, 927 34, 710
Notes: Table 5 presents the treatment effect of the quota removal on firm-level total import volume. The treatment
group contains firms exporting textile products to the U.S., Canada, or EU with a quota fill rate above 90%.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: The Impact of the Quota Removal on Firm-level Extensive Import Decisions (Fill Rate)
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
1 2 3 4
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Treatment 2.0686∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗∗ 0.5466∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0 .3300 ) (0 .0052 ) (0 .2757 ) (0 .0057 )
# of Product 1.2050∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗ 0.6909∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗
(0 .0163 ) (0 .0000 ) (0 .0163 ) (0 .0000 )
Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.24 0.23 0.12 0.23
Obs 66, 927 66, 927 34, 710 34, 710
Notes: Table 6 presents the treatment effect of the quota removal on the firm-level imported varieties of interme-
diates at firm-level. The treatment group contains firms exporting textile products to the U.S., Canada, or EU
with a quota fill rate above 90%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 7: The Impact of the Quota Removal on Firm-level Intensive Import Margin (Fill Rate)
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
1 2
Treatment 0.1922∗∗∗ 0.2677∗∗∗
(0.0607 ) (0.0760 )
# of Product 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗
(0.0005 ) (0.0025 )
Ownership FE Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes
R-square 0.09 0.11
Obs 66, 927 34, 710
Notes: Table 7 presents the treatment effect of quota removal on firm-level total import volume. The treatment
group contains firms exporting textile products to the U.S., Canada, or EU with a quota fill rate above 90%.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: The Impact of the Quota Removal on Firm-level Extensive Import Margins (Single
Product Firms)
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
1 2 3 4
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Treatment 2.0110∗∗∗ 0.0972∗∗∗ 0.6922∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗
(0 .3759 ) (0 .0078 ) (0 .3232 ) (0 .0105 )
# of Product 1.6954∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗ 1.0319∗∗∗ 0.0545∗∗∗
(0 .0209 ) (0 .0001 ) (0 .0226 ) (0 .0001 )
Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.27 0.31 0.14 0.32
Obs 56, 056 56, 056 27, 651 27, 651
Notes: Table 6 presents the treatment effect of the quota removal on the number of imported varieties at the
firm-level. The treatment group contains firms exporting textile products to the U.S., Canada, or EU with a
quota fill rate above 90%. All firms are single product firms. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 9: The Impact of the Quota Removal on Firm-level Intensive Import Margins (Single
Product Firms)
Full Sample Ordinary Trade
1 2
Treatment 0.2822∗∗∗ 0.2477∗∗∗
(0.0779 ) (0.0957 )
# of Product 0.0398∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗
(0.0021 ) (0.0038 )
Ownership FE Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes
R-square 0.10 0.12
Obs 66, 927 34, 710
Notes: Table 9 presents the treatment effect of the quota removal on firm-level total imported volumes. The
treatment group contains firms exporting textile products to the U.S., Canada, or EU with a quota fill rate above
90%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Appendix (Proofs)
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Similar to Antras et al. (2014), when (σ − 1)/θ > 1, the profit function
in (12) exhibits increasing differences in (Iijt, Iikt) for j, k ∈ {1, ...J} with j 6= k.
Furthermore, it also features increasing difference in (Iijt, EBt) for j ∈ J . Making
using of Topkis’s monotonicity theorem, I can then conclude that for any demand
shock such thatEBt > Bt−1, there must be (Ii1t(ϕ,EBt), Ii2t(ϕ,EBt)..., IiJt(ϕ,EBt)) ≥
(Ii1(ϕ,Bt−1), Ii2t(ϕ,Bt−1)..., IiJt(ϕ,Bt−1)). Therefore, this inequality rules out a
situation in which Iijt(ϕ,EBt) = 0 but Ii1t(ϕ,Bt−1) = 1, and as a result the
conclusion Ji(ϕ,EBt) ⊇ Ji(ϕ,Bt−1) for EBt > Bt−1 holds.
Proof of Intensive Margin of Imports
Proof. The total cost of intermediates is proportional to operating revenue, that
is:
Ctoti (ϕ,EBt) =
σ − 1
σ
Ri(ϕ,EBt)
=
σ − 1
σ
ϕσ−1(γΘi(ϕ,EBt))(σ−1)/θEBt. (A1)
where Ri(ϕ,EBt) and C
tot
i (ϕ,EBt) are the total revenue and costs of a firm with
productivity ϕ based in country i, respectively. From Proposition 1, for any de-
mand shock in period t such that EBt > Bt−1, it follows that Ji(ϕ,EBt) ⊇
Ji(ϕ,Bt−1). This inequality further implies that the offshoring capability is in-
creasing in the demand shock, which in turn increases the expected aggregate
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residual demand, EBt:
Θi(ϕ,EBt) > Θi(ϕ,Bt−1). (A2)
Inequality (A1) and (A2) imply that positive correlation between expected aggre-
gate residual demand (or demand shocks) and the total cost of intermediates:
Ctoti (ϕ,EBt) > C
tot
i (ϕ,Bt−1). (A3)
Recall that Proposition 2 implies that the offshoring probability of each intermedi-
ate, χ(ϕ,EBt), is non-decreasing in the expected aggregate residual demand, EBt,
or χ(ϕ,EBt) > χ(ϕ,Bt−1). Along with inequality (A3), the costs of importing are
increasing in the residual demand:
Cimi (ϕ,EBt) = C
tot
i (ϕ,EBt)χ(ϕ,EBt) > C
tot
i (ϕ,Bt−1)χ(ϕ,Bt−1) = C
im
i (ϕ,Bt−1).
(A4)
Inequality (A4) implies that the imported value of intermediates is increasing in
the demand shock, which affects the expected residual demand a firm faces.
Proof of Inequality (13)
Proof. There are two situations when a demand shock takes place in country k
at period t: country k dose not belong to a firm’s export set at period t − 1,
k /∈ Jex(ϕ,Bωt−1) or country k belongs to a firm’s export set at period t − 1,
k ∈ Jex(ϕ,Bωt−1).
Case 1: When country k does not belong to a firm’s export set in period t− 1
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∂EBt
∂EBkt
= sign(∆Jex(ϕ,Bω))
∑
∆Jex(ϕ,Bω)
EBjt, (A5)
∆Jex(ϕ,Bω) = Jex(ϕ,EBωt )− Jex(ϕ,Bωt−1). (A6)
where EBωt = {B1,t−1, B2,t−1, ..., Bk,t−1 + ∆Bkt, ...BJ,t−1} is the expected world
residual demand vector in period t, and Bωt−1 = {B1,t−1, B2,t−1, ..., Bk,t−1, ...BJ,t−1}
is the counterpart before the demand shock. Note that the economy is in an
equilibrium before the demand shock, as such, the residual demand in each country
is constant before period t. The expected residual demand in each country equals
to its realization. I claim that if ∆Bkt > 0, equation (A6) must be positive.
Suppose the opposite is true, ∆Bkt > 0, but J
ex(ϕ,EBωt ) − Jex(ϕ,Bωt−1) < 0.
From Proposition 1, we must have
Jsi (ϕ,EBt) ⊆ Jsi (ϕ,Bt−1), (A7)
where EBt and Bt−1 are the expected aggregate residual demand faced by a firm in
period t and t− 1, respectively. Condition (A7) says that when the demand shock
is in the country not belonging to the firm’s export set, and this shock causes this
firm to export to fewer countries, EBt < Bt−1. Condition (A7) further implies
that the offshoring capability
Θ(ϕ,EBt) < Θ(ϕ,Bt−1).
This indicates that if a positive demand shock in country k at period t shrinks
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a firm’s export set, it also reduces this firm’s offshoring capability. All of the
above discussion shows that when the firm faces a world residual demand vector
EBωt , it maximizes its profit by exporting to fewer countries and searching fewer
countries than it did when facing the world residual demand vector Bωt−1. This
is a contradiction because this firm could search and export to the same set of
countries after the demand shock, which will result in firm the same expected
profit as that before the demand shock. The profit associated with the original
search and export strategies must be higher than the current profit, otherwise,
this firm does not maximize its profit when facing the aggregate residual demand
before the demand shock, Bt−1.
Therefore, if country k does not belong to a firm’s export set, after a positive
demand shock, this firm must keep its original export set of countries or export to
more countries. This implies ∂EBt
∂EBkt
≥ 0.
Case 2: country k belongs to a firm’s export set.
∂EBt
∂EBkt
= 1 + sign(∆Jex(ϕ,Bω))
∑
∆Jex(ϕ,Bω)
EBjt. (A8)
If sign(∆Jex(ϕ,Bω))
∑
∆Jex(ϕ,Bω)
EBjt < −1, which implies ∂EBt∂EBkt < 0, following
the same logic as in case 1, we can show the contradiction. It is straight forward
to show sign(∆Jex(ϕ,Bω)) > 0. Since ∂EBt
∂Bkt
> 0, from Proposition 1 Jsi (ϕ,EBt) ⊇
Jsi (ϕ,Bt−1). This further implies Θ(ϕ,EBt) ≥ Θ(ϕ,Bt−1). After the demand
shock, the firm increases its search set, and hence reduces its marginal assembly
costs. If a country belongs to this firm’s export set before the shock, it must belong
to the set after the shock. This is because, the profit from exporting to any country
belonging to the original export set increases after the cost reduction. Furthermore,
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with reduced marginal costs, this firm could penetrate other countries which do not
belong to its export set before the demand shock. Therefore, sign(∆Jex(ϕ,Bω)) >
0.
In sum, a firm’s export set and search set are both non-decreasing for a positive
demand shock in any country.
Proof for Inequality (15)
Proof. The unit export costs for a firm exporting from base country i to country
j in period s, under the unit license fee is:
cquotafs (ϕ) = τijcfs(ϕ) + lj. (A9)
where cquotafs (ϕ) is the unit assembly cost under the quota restriction. lj > 0 if
country j is subject to an import quota and s < t, while lj = 0 if t ≥ s or country
j does not impose as import quota. The unit export cost under the unit license
fee becomes:
pjs(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1(τijcfs(ϕ) + lj). (A10)
Equation (A10) implies that the unit license fee accounts for a larger cost share
for firms with higher productivity. This further means that a quota removal would
have a larger impact on more productive firms’ price, quantity, and profit. Let
τ̂ij = τij +
lj
cfs(ϕ)
, the profit in market j in period s without considering any fixed
cost is:
pijs =
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)1−σ
Aj τ̂
1−σ
ij cfs(ϕ)
1−σ. (A11)
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Similar to equation (3), we can show inequality (15) as follows:
Bj,t−1 =
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)(1−σ)
Aj τ̂
1−σ
ij <
1
σ
(
σ
1− σ
)(1−σ)
Ajτ
1−σ
ij = EBjt. (A12)
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